Akwnulasi kapital publik dan swasta merupakan faktor utama dalam pertumbuhan ekonomi Tulisan ini mengtgi faktor-faktor penentu perilaku investasi publik dengan menggunakan contoh investasi irigasi pemerintah di Indonesia. Dalam hal ini pemerintah Indonesia bertindak sebagai perencana sosial, memaksimalkan keuntungan sosial dalam mengalokasikan sumberdaya untuk investasi irigasi dengan kendala sumberdaya yang terbatas.
INTRODUCTION
The rate of accumulation of public and private capital is a key factor in economic growth. A number of studies have examined the determinants of private investment in developing countries, but with the exception of early work by Hayami and Kikuchi (1978) , there has been little systematic analysis of the determinants of public investment, which accounts for a large share of capital formation. Analysis of private investment behavior have treated public investment as exogenously determined, and have examined whether public investment affects private investment positively, by reducing private costs of investment or increasing the productivity of private investment; or negatively, by crowding out private investment (Gandhi, 1990; Tun Wai and Wong, 1982; Sundarajan and Thakur, 1980) . Irrigation investment accounted for more than one-half of public expenditures in agriculture in the 1980s, and publicly-funded irrigation accounts for 85 percent of irrigated area and 75 percent of rice production in Indonesia (Sudaryanto, et al., 1992; Rosegrant, et al., 1987) .
Annual irrigation development expenditures and area completed by type of investment, 1969/70to 1993/94,areshowninAppendixFigures 1 and2. Theannual data are summarized by five-year development plan (Repelita) in Appendix Tables  1 and 2 . The government irrigation budget is divided into four main categories: (1) new irrigation construction, which includes investment in new reservoir and l) Researcher of1he Intem:tional Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Z) Director of the Center for Agrosocio-ecmomic Research (CASER) diversion irrigation systems; (2) rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems; (3) swamp and tidal irrigation, which are small systems with relatively few water control structures that rely on natural flooding or tidal movement for water; and ( 4) river and flood control. As shown in the figures and tables, the irrigation investment program grew dramatically during the first three Repelitas. Real expenditures in the third plan were more than four times larger than in the first plan. However, expenditures declined by almost 20 percent between Repel ita ill and Repelita IV. During Repel ita V, the expenditures were 65 percent higher then those of Repelita IV.
Although declining in relative importance, rehabilitation expenditures increased substantially in absolute terms through the third plan, but dropped by 32 percent in the fourth plan. In the last plan, however the rehabilitation expenditures increased by 52 percent. Over the course of the first three plans, expenditures on construction of new irrigation systems increased rapidly and received the largest aggregate share of expenditures, averaging 38 percent of expenditures during the first three Repelitas. Real expenditures on new construction increased nearly ten-fold between the first and third plans, before declining by 12 percent in the fourth plan. The swamp and tidal irrigation development program, which received nearly 30 percent of expenditures in the first Repelita, has declined in relative importance to about 5 percent, but received a nearly constant level of expenditures through the first three plans. Like the other programs, swamp and tidal irrigation investment declined sharply in the fourth plan, by 31 percent. After a small initial program, river and flood control received about 30 percent of expenditures over the last three plans, with a decline in expenditure of over 9 percent in the third plan and an increase by 75 percent in the fmal period.
The completion of physical areas by type of development over the first four Repelitas is shown in Appendix Table 2 . Area rehabilitated totaled 950,000 hectare in the first plan, and declined steadily thereafter to 150,000 in the third Repelita. The rehabilitation, however, expanded to 1,165,000 hectare in the last Repelita. Completions of new irrigated are more than doubled between the first and third plans, to 436,000 hectare, before declining to 180,000 hectare in the fourth plan and increasing to 427,000 hectare in the fifth plan. Swamp and tidal irrigation peaked at 450,000 hectare completed in the third plan. Area brought under river and flood control in the fifth plan were 78 percent higher than the totals in the fourth plan.
A number of factors have been hypothesized to cause the large reduction in the irrigation investment program in the fourth plan, including declining oil prices and a slowdown in growth in gross national product (both of which reduce government revenue); and declining world rice prices and increasing costs per hectare of irrigation investment, which reduce the social profitability of investment in irrigation (Rosegrant, et al., 1987) . Do governments act as rational social planners, allocating public resources so as to maximize net social returns?. 1his question is explored in this paper, which analyzes public investment behavior in irrigation in Indonesia using a behavioral model adapted from MWldlak (1988) , which in tum is a variant on Jorgenson's (1967 Jorgenson's ( , 1971 neoclassical investment model.
METHODOLOGY Theoretical Investment Model
The model of public investment behavior is based on the assumption that the government acts to maximize net social returns-over time. First, define the multi-period net returns to investment:
where the output of the investment is represented by a production fimction F(v,K), vis a vector of variable inputs and K is the vector of capital, pis the output price, w is the vector of input prices, q is the vector of prices of capital, K is the time derivative of capital K, g is the rate of depreciation, and t denotes the time period.
The decision is formulated as an intertemporal optimization problem in which the government selects the time path of investment that maximizes the expected present value of the stream of net returns Rt. If r is the discoWlt factor and vt and Kt are the variable and capital input allocations, the problems is to
(2) subject to the initial condition K(O) = Ko and the transversality condition lim [e- 11 R (t)] = 0. Eo(X) is the expected value of X conditional on the information set at t=O. Assuming certainty equivalence and an interior solution, first order conditions for vt indicate that along the optimal path, the quantity of input allocated to each technique at t does not affect revenues in subsequent periods. Consequently, the problem can be solved recursively; the first step is to determine optimal input levels vt*=v(st), where st = {pt, wt, Kt}, the vector of state variables. Because of the recursive nature of the problem, the first stage solution for vt is determined using standard single period-profit maximization procedures equating each input's value marginal product to its real price in each period.
Longer run investment decisions are determined in the second stage of the optimization by choosing Kt to maximize:
were 1t( s) = PtFt-Wtvt*, subject to the constraints of (2) 
Determination of Actual Investment
The framework described above derives the optimal or desired capital stock as a fimction of the specified stateyariables. The actual stock capital, however, does not in general adjust instantaneously to changes in the desired stock. Instead, changes in desired capital are transformed into actual investment through a partial adjustment process (McGuirk and Mundlak, 1991; Gandhi, 1990; Clark, 1979; Jorgenson, 1971; Koyck, 1954) .
In the partial adjustment model of investment, it is assumed that capital is adjusted toward its desired level by a constant proportion of the difference between desired and actual capital, or more generally, as a weighted average of past levels of desired capital. Using the same notation as above, but restoring the time subscripts, a general partial adjustment model can be defined as follows:
Where It is actual investment, and F(at) is a function representing the adjustment process in moving from desired levels of capital stock to actual levels of capital stock.
A number of theories have been advanced to explain the partial adjustment model of investment. Eisner and Strotz (1963) first suggested a theory based on the internal costs of adjustment to the firm. In this theory, firms pay a penalty for having a capital stock different from the desired level, and incur adjustment costs in attempting to move to that level. The actual investment is that which minimizes the total costs in the trade-off between having less or more than desired investment and the costs of adjustment (Clark, 1979) . Internal adjustment costs include the physical lags in the planning and implementation of desired capital investment.
McGuirk and Mundlak (1991 Mundlak ( , 1992 and Gandhi (1990}, on the other hand, stress the importance of external adjustment costs such as the availability of resources to the firm or to the government. External resource constraints may be important for both public investment, which relies on tax and other revenues to finance new investment, and for private firms. In developing countries, in particular, the availability ofloanable funds may not be fully reflected in the interest rate. With imperfect capital markets, loanable financial resources may be rationed at prevailing interest rates.
The model utilized here decomposes the adjustment costs f( a.t) into the internal costs and the external costs or resource constraints. The internal costs of adjustment, which induce physical lags in implementation of desired investment, are represented by a distributed lag operator. The distributed lag process describes the structure and period of the transformation of desired investment into actual investment.
This process of implementing desired investment, however, is also conditioned on the availability of external resources. The impact of external resource constraints on actual investment take place within the same period, and are assumed to be proportional to the desired or optimal level of new investment (Gandhi, 1990; Blejer and Kahn, 1984; Coen, 1968 
Empirical Specification
Foi the empirical estimation of the determinants of irrigation investment in Indonesia, investment is disagregated intothefourmain categories of new irrigation construction, rehabilitation, swamp and tidal irrigation, and river and flood control. Investment functions are estimated for total irrigation investment and by type of investment. As implied in the theoretical model of public investment behavior, investment in each type of irrigation is estimated as a function of the net profits generated by the investment relative to net profits of other sectors, the costs of investment in irrigation, and the availability of public resources for investment. The investment model is estimated using two alternative definitions of profitability of irrigation. The measures of profitability of investment in irrigation are based on the relative profitability of rice production, which accounts for aver 80 percent of irrigated area. The alternative definitions of profitability used are the world price of rice deflated by the manufacturing unit value index; and net rice revenues per hectare (world rice price times rice yield per hectare less fertilizer and labor costs per hectare) deflated by the index of value added per capita in the non-agricultural sector. The latter measure is a proxy for the profitability of resources utilized in the non-agricultural sector.
For the total investment function, the cost measure is the area-weighted real average cost per hectare across the four types of irrigation development, while the investment functions by type of investment utilize the real cost per hectare for each type of irrigation development. The proxy variables for the availability of public resources are the real gross national product per capita; and the real world price of oil. The latter variables is included because of its large impact on government revenues, and on availability of foreign exchange. The model is specified in general form as follows:
where IRREXPi is the expenditures on irrigation of type i, GNPC is the per capita gross national product,POJListhe real world price of oil, WPRICEis the real world price of rice, COSTHAi is the real cost per hectare of irrigation development of type i, and 9t is the stochastic error term. Alternatively, REVRICE, the net rice revenue per hectare deflated by the index of value added per capita in the non-agricultural sector, is utilized in place ofWPRICE as the measure of returns to irrigation.
The general form of the distributed lag cannot be effectively estimated because of the loss of degrees of freedom and multicollinearity between the price and cost variables in time t and the lagged values of these variables. In order to make the problems tractable, a structure is imposed on the distributed lag based on the construction process of irrigation projects.
The actual specification of the lag structure is an empirical question. Among the lag structures widely used in the literature are rational, Koyck, and polynomial distributed lags. In the analysis here, the lag structure can be determined based on observation of the actual physical implementation process for irrigation systems. The lag process in irrigation construction suggests a polynomial distributed lag of degree two. Lags in the irrigation development process include lags between project appraisal and approval, between approval and initiation of construction, and between initiation and completion (Svendson and Ramirez, 1990) . As a result of this process, expenditures on a project generally follow a quadratic polynomial distribution, with relatively small but increasing expenditures in the early years; large expenditures in the middle years of construction, as the headworks and main canals are constructed; and then declining expenditures as secondary and tertiary canals are completed (Appendix Figure 3) . In order to estimate investment models consistent with the stylized facts of the irrigation Construction process, the./Jis and 9is in equation ( 1 0) are therefore restricted to be on a polynomial of degree two and length n. Suppressing the subscript i for type of irrigation for clarity of presentation.
.
Substituting (11) and (12) into equation (10) 
where
Thus, irrigation expenditures (IRREXPt) are estimated as a function of the constructed variables ZWPRICEjt and ZCOSHTAjt and the resulting estimates of bj and Cj are utilized in equations (11) and (12) to compute estimates offls and 9s.
Lags in irrigation construction vary from project to project depending upon the size and type of the project, location, and efficiency of the construction process. The final step in specification of the empirical model is determination of the length of the lag. Use ofF-Tests for goodness-of-fit introducer a substantial upward bias in lag length (Maddala, 1988) . The Schwarz posterior probability criterion for model selection is therefore utilized instead of the F-test. The Schwarz criterion incorporates both a measure of precision of the estimates and a measure of parsimony in model parameterization and therefore eliminates the upward bias in choosing the lag length (Ramanathan, 1989; Judge, eta/., 1980) . Based on the Schwarz criterion, a lag length of five years is utilized for rice price and revenue in the total investment, new irrigation construction, rehabilitation, and river and flood control investment equations, and a three year lag length is used in the swamp and tidal investment equation. For the capital cost variable, a five-year lag·is utilized in the swamp and tidal irrigation investment equation, and six years in all other equations.
Data and Estimation Procedures
The variables utilized in the various specifications of the regression model are defmed in Appendix Table 3 . The sources for the basic data are as follows: (a) Directorate General for Water Resource Development (DGWRD), Ministry of Public Works for real annual expenditures on new irrigation construction and real capital costs per hectare for irrigation development; (b) Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for real gross national product, net revenue per hectare for rice, and the index of value added per capita in the non-agricultural sector; (c) the World Bank for the real world price of rice and the real world price of oil. The data covers the period .
All estimated equations showed statistically significant serial correlation. Estimation of the total investment equation was therefore undertaken using generalized least squares with correction for serial correlation. The set of equations by type of investment were estimated as a system, using Zellner's generalized least squares estimator for seemingly unrelated regressions, with correction for serial correlation. In each equation, rho was estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator suggested by Beach and MacKinnon (1978) .
PUBLIC INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
The estimated equations for the price and revenue models are presented in Tables 1-2 , and the estimated elasticities of irrigation investment with respect to the exogenous variables computed from these equations are shown in Tables 3-4 . The results are in general excellent, and confirm the strong impact of relative profitability and resource financial constraints on public investment in irrigation in Indonesia. The signs of the estimated parameters are in most cases as predicted by the theoretical model and highly significant, and the K range from 0.48 to 0.98 (Tables 1-2 ). There is little to choose from between the price and revenue models: the goodness-of-fit is virtually the same, and the estimated elasticities are similar. While the results overall strongly support the hypothesized effects, the results that differ from prior expectations also provide interesting insights.
For example, for the swamp and tidal irrigation equation under both price and revenue formulations, most of the signs of the estimated parameters and the long term elasticities are unexpected (Tables 1 and 2) . Per capita GNP, price of oil, price of rice, and rice revenue all have negative long term effects on swamp and tidal irrigation investment. A possible explanation for these results is that investment in swamp and tidal irrigation is guided more by social welfare goals other than by maximization of social returns. Swamp and tidal irrigation investments have been undertaken mainly in conjunction with the "transmigration" program). which seeks to relocate rural families from the densely populated island of Java" to other islands. The government may be operating so as to maintain incentives for transmigrants by increasing swamp and tidal irrigation expenditure levels as compensation during periods of declining rice prices or income levels.
The equations for total irrigation, new irrigation, rehabilitation, and river and flood control all show positive effects on investment in time t of an increase in the cost per hectare of irrigation during time periods t and/or t-1 (Tables 1 and 2 ). This relationship seems counterintuitive, but is in fact plausible. An increase in the cost per unit of investment will have two effects: first, the increased unit cost of new projects will be reflected also in an increased per unit cost of on-going projects, which will have the effect of increasing the total expenditures in the on-going portfolio of construction; second, as predicted in the model, there will be an induced shift out of irrigation and into more profitable investments. The positive impact of cost increases on expenditures in the initial years indicates that the first effect is dominant in those years. In the long run, though, the relative profitability effect dominates (Table 3 and 4).
The negative effect of price in period ton investment in period tin several of the equations is likely explained by the tendency that, in the short run, a price increase will cause diversion of government expenditures from investment to consumption expenditures. Due to the political importance of stable rice prices, the immediate response of the Indonesian government to a rice price increase may be to divert funds from irrigation and other long term investments to the financing of rice imports to relieve short term price pressure. In the longer run, the expected positive impact ofthe price increase on investments dominates for total irrigation and new irrigation construction, but the diversion-of-funds effect dominates for rehabilitation.
The elasticities of irrigation investment with respect to per capita GNP range from 2.00 to 3.11 for total irrigation, new irrigation construction, and rehabilitation, and 4.81-6.45 for river and flood control. While the elasticities are large, they do not seem excessive, since a small percentage change in per capita GNP generates large shifts in government revenues relative to irrigation expenditures. The impact of the world price of oil on irrigation investments is also substantial: with the exception of the negative elasticity for swamp and tidal irrigation (see above), the investment elasticities with respecttothepriceofoil range from 0.38to 0.79 (Tables  3-4) for the different types of irrigation.
The long run elasticity of response for new irrigation construction, river and flood control, and total irrigation investment to world prices are 1.00, 4.03, and 1.04, respectively (Table 3 ). The price elasticities are negative for rehabilitation andswamp and tidal irrigation, as discussed above. The investment elasticities with respect to revenues are similar to the price elasticities: 1.02, 3.31, and 0.83 for new construction, river and flood control, and total irrigation investment, respectively; and negative for the other two types of irrigation (Table 4) . Finally, the long run elasticities of investment with respect to the capital costs of irrigation are negative for all types of irrigation, in either model specification. The elasticity of total investment with respect to capital cost is -1.04 in the price model and -1.05 in the revenue model, and ranges from -0.70 to -1.93 for different types of irrigation and different models (Table 3-4). 
CONCLUSIONS
Desired in vestment in irrigation is a function of the profitability of investment in irrigation relative to other investments, and actual investment adjusts over time to desired levels, conditioned on the external costs of adjustment represented by financial resource constraints, and the internal costs of adjustment, which induce physical lags in the implementation of desired investment.
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Indonesian government acts as a social planner, maximizing net social benefits in the allocation of resources to irrigation investment subject to resource constraints. The government is highly responsive to both economic incentives and resource constraints in determining investment levels. The long run elasticities of response of total irrigation investment and new irrigation construction with respect to world rice prices are about 1.00, and with respect to capital costs of irrigation are -1.04 to -1.35. Therelativelylonglagsestimatedhereininvestmentresponsetopricesimply gradual adjustments in investment to changing prices over time. Included in the adjustments is the recent policy to transfer the responsibility of land development from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Public Works. It is expected that such a policy will speed up the investment response to changing prices. At any given point in time, the investment level is in effect a function of long run average rice price and average capital costs per hectare, conditioned on availability of resources. The relatively gradual long term adjustment process will tend to dampen the cyclical effects arising from investment response to changing rice prices.
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